Every Android app declares its permissions in a file called AndroidManifest.xml. If an app wants
to talk to the internet, it has to list the android.permission.INTERNET permission. Without it,
the Android operating system itself refuses to open any network socket — no HTTP, no HTTPS, no
DNS, no background sync, nothing.
BLNAK does not declare INTERNET. You can verify this yourself in thirty seconds. Open the
source on GitHub, open app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml, and search for the word “internet”. You
will find one result — a comment explaining why it is deliberately absent.
This is not a promise. It is a constraint that Android enforces for us, whether we like it or not.
What this guarantees
Because Android refuses network calls for apps without the permission, a huge class of privacy violations becomes physically impossible in BLNAK:
- The app cannot send analytics events.
- The app cannot upload crash reports.
- The app cannot phone home to check licensing.
- The app cannot load ads.
- The app cannot sync your preferences to a cloud account.
- The app cannot tell a third party which apps you have installed.
None of the above is a feature we chose not to build. Even if a malicious contributor snuck code into a future release, Android would silently block every network attempt until the permission was added — which would require a new release, a changed manifest, and a very public question: why does a launcher suddenly need the internet?
Verification in three ways
- Read the manifest. Public, on GitHub, human-readable.
- Read the Play Store listing. Google lists every declared permission under “See more” on every app page. Compare BLNAK’s list to a typical launcher’s.
- Use a network monitor. Install a tool like NetGuard or PCAPdroid. Let BLNAK run for a
week. Check the log. You will see zero outbound connections attributable to
life.marzi.blnak.
Why other apps won’t do this
Most launchers depend on network access for something — wallpaper sync, app recommendations, sponsored tiles, telemetry, A/B testing. Once an app has the permission for even one “good” reason, the wall is down and everything else slips in alongside it. The only way to rule out network abuse is to rule out network at all, at the manifest level. BLNAK does.
This is not a privacy policy. This is not a trust-us promise. This is a property of the binary that Android enforces whether we want it to or not. When we say no outgoing data, we mean it in the strongest sense the operating system provides.